

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY WEST GERMANY USSR

REPORT NO.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

SUBJECT NEW SOVIET APPROACH TO WEST GERMAN
POLITICIANS

DATE DISTR.

22 AUGUST 1962

PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

DATE OF 20-24 AUGUST 1962
INFO.

REFERENCES

84 13526-8

PLACE 3 E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

FIELD REPORT NO. FEGN-1469

APPRaisal 3

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

1.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

CIB

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET 3.3(b)(1)
DISSEMINATION
CONTROLS

STATE ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC COI ONE OCR ORR DIA EXC

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL.

E.O. 13526, SECTION 53(b)(3)

ISCAP No. 2011-0516 document 19

Withheld from public disclosure as provided for in
50 U.S.C. 403(g) section 6, the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949.

CLASSIFICATION -- DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

Withheld from public disclosure as provided for in
50 U.S.C. 403(g) section 6, the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

13518

卷之三

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

A REPORT ON THE SOVIET EMBASSY'S VIEWS WAS
PRESENTED [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1) DURING THE WEEK OF 20 AUGUST 62.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

DURING THE WEEK OF 20 AUGUST 62.

2. THIS REPORT SAID THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S POSITION VIS-A-VIS ITS ALLIES AND THE ALLIED POWERS HAD CHANGED SINCE THE USSR'S MOST RECENT SPACE SUCCESSES. THIS CHANGE WAS IMPORTANT IN REGARD TO THE GERMAN QUESTION SINCE THE PRESTIGE GAINED FROM THE SPACE ACHIEVEMENTS ENABLED THE SOVIET UNION TO WAIT SINCE THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY PRESSURE TO MOVE QUICKLY. THESE CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT MEAN THE SOVIETS WOULD WAIT INDEFINITELY. IF, HOWEVER, THE WESTERN POWERS INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN "TRUE NEGOTIATIONS" THE USSR WAS PREPARED "TO GO ALONG." WORLD, AND WEST GERMANY IN PARTICULAR, SHOULD REALIZE THERE ARE NOW ONLY TWO REAL POWERS, THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION. THOUGHT THAT CLOSE COOPERATION AMONG THE WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS COULD MAKE THEM EQUAL TO THESE TWO POWERS IN SCIENTIFIC AND MILITARY ACHIEVEMENT WAS RIDICULOUS. WITH ALL THEIR RESOURCES AND TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE, THE WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WERE TOO FAR BEHIND THE TWO POWERS.

3. THEREFORE WESTERN EUROPE WOULD BE WISER TO SEEK GOOD
RELATIONS WITH THE TWO GREAT POWERS AND AT THE SAME TIME TO TRY
TO PROMOTE A SOVIET-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT. WITH THE PRESENT POWER

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

卷之三

Withheld from public disclosure as provided for in
50 U.S.C. 403(g) section 6, the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949.

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

Withheld from public disclosure as provided for in
50 U.S.C. 403(g) section 6, the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949.

IN 13518

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

PAGE 3

(64C)

RELATIONSHIPS. THE GERMAN PEOPLE CAN ONLY BE ASSURED A SECURE FUTURE IF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE IS IMPROVED. SOVIET UNION FINDS IT INCOMPREHENSIBLE THAT THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT IS SO OPPOSED TO PEACE TREATY DISCUSSIONS SINCE THESE WERE OBVIOUSLY THE ONLY WAY TO MAKE ANY PROGRESS ON THE GERMAN QUESTION. SOVIET UNION WAS NOT PRESSED FOR A PEACE TREATY. AND ALL SHE HOPED TO GAIN WAS PEACEFUL RELATIONS. SUCH RELATIONS WOULD CLEAR THE WAY FOR A SOLUTION OF THE BERLIN PROBLEM, WHICH COULD NO LONGER BE TREATED AS NEGLIGIBLE SINCE TENSIONS ARE MOUNTING AND THE TWO POWER BLOCS ARE IN DIRECT CONFRONTATION. A SOLUTION OF THE BERLIN PROBLEM OBVIOUSLY MUST BE FOUND SINCE POPULAR CONFIDENCE WAS CLEARLY DIMINISHING AT A RAPID RATE. "WALL" PROBLEM COULD ALSO BE SOLVED ONCE THE SITUATION IN WEST BERLIN HAD BEEN CHANGED AND THE NEED TO PROTECT EAST GERMANY AGAINST PROVOCATIONS NO LONGER EXISTED.

4.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

Withheld from public disclosure as provided for in
50 U.S.C. 403(g) section 6, the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949.

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)Withheld from public disclosure as provided for in
50 U.S.C. 403(g) section 6, the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949.

IN 13518

PAGE 1

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

5.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

THE SOVIET UNION, WITH HER PRESTIGE TREMENDOUSLY ENHANCED BY THE SPACE FEAT, WAS UNDER NO PRESSURE, EITHER INTERNAL OR FROM THE OTHER BLOC COUNTRIES, TO PRODUCE SOME VICTORY IN BERLIN OR A FIRM SOLUTION FOR BERLIN. IF THE AMERICANS WERE WILLING OR ALLOWED BY THEIR ALLIES TO ENTER INTO REAL NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE PREPARED TO START TALKS AGAIN, EVEN THOUGH THEY MIGHT LAST FOR SOME TIME. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT'S OBVIOUS UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT SUCH NEGOTIATIONS LET ALONE PARTICIPATE IN THEM IN ANY WAY, COULD ONLY MAKE MATTERS MORE DIFFICULT SINCE THE SOVIET UNION WAS BEGINNING TO DOUBT WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HOLD FRUITFUL TALKS UNDER THE THREAT THAT ANY AGREEMENT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S VETO AT THE LAST MINUTE.

6.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

SOVIET PREMIER NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV FELT THE PRESENT IMPASSE COULD PROBABLY ONLY BE OVERCOME WITH ANOTHER MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~Withheld from public disclosure as provided for in
50 U.S.C. 403(g) section 6, the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~

(When Filled In)

Withheld from public disclosure as provided for in
50 U.S.C. 403(g) section 6, the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

IN 13518
PAGE 5

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

IN FACT

THE SOVIET UNION HAD OFFERED TO ENGAGE IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS DESIGNED TO PUT HER RELATIONS WITH BOTH GERMANIES ON A MORE SOLID BASIS. IT WAS NOT, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET UNION THAT WOULD PROFIT MOST FROM THIS BUT RATHER THE GERMAN PEOPLE AND WEST GERMANY. SINCE THE BERLIN SITUATION WAS BECOMING CRITICAL AND THE WESTERN POWERS SHOWED NO WILLINGNESS TO IMPROVE IT, THE SOVIET UNION BELIEVED THE PEACE WAS NOW REALLY ENDANGERED AND WOULD HAVE TO BRING THE PROBLEM BEFORE THE U. N. AND DEMAND THAT THE WESTERN TROOPS BE REMOVED FROM THE "POWDER KEG." IT WAS HARD TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE WEST GERMAN PEOPLE DID NOT REALIZE THAT THE WESTERN POWERS KEPT THEIR TROOPS IN BERLIN ONLY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THEIR GRIP ON GERMANY AND THUS TO BIND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC TO A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PRECLUDING REUNIFICATION FOR ALL TIME. WEST BERLIN PEOPLE WOULD SUFFER MOST FROM THIS POLICY. IF THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE UNWILLING TO DISCUSS POSSIBILITIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION, THE LATTER WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO MAKE WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS POSSIBLE WITH THE NATIONS IN POWER IN GERMANY.

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMB), ARMY, AIR.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~Withheld from public disclosure as provided for in
50 U.S.C. 403(g) section 6, the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949.